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Abstract
Some European regulators have decided to force competition in their na-
tional markets. They have decided to go beyond the second directive and apply
asymmetric regulation. Gas release programs and market shares constraints
are the two asymmetric decisions imposed to incumbents. When a regulator
imposes a gas release program to an incumbent, this operator is compelled to
release quantities of its long term contracts to its competitor. In this paper, we
will focus on gas release and its impact on welfare, consumer surplus and on the
level of released quantities set by regulators.
The aim of a gas release program is to give access to natural gas to com-
petitors. They become actives on the market and are in competition with the
incumbent. These programs are time limited. They only help competitors in
expecting the development of hubs or new investments in importation infrastruc-
tures. If competitors want to stay active after the program, they may find others
supply sources to increase security of supply.
The gas release can induce Raising Rival’s Costs or “Self-Sabotage” strate-
gies. We use a Cournot model with capacity constraints to answer two questions.
First, we will study the impact of these strategies on consumer surplus and
welfare. We will show that there are no impact on consumer surplus but the wel-
fare decreases. The gas release program introduces a transfer of profit between
competitor and incumbent, reduces welfare because of the increase in costs of
supply, but has no impact on total consumed quantities.
Then, we will suppose that the regulator is setting released quantities max-
imising welfare. Gas release price is often based on costs plus a bid or a fixed
premium. Quantities are set with a less obvious process. We will demonstrate
that the regulator must set released quantities :
- that would not be so high if incumbent’s supplies are small to avoid Self-
Sabotage or RRC strategies;
- as a function of incumbent’s supplies if they are in intermediate values to
avoid strategies seen above and to optimise quantities sold on the market;
1We are very grateful to Gaz de France for their financial support and to Pr. J. Percebois,
E. Baranes, Y. Smeers, C. Crampes, J-C Poudou and f. Mirabel for their helpful comments,
ideas and discussions. The usual caveat applies. The positions expressed in this paper are not
official positions of Gaz de France.
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- at a sufficient level to let the two operators playing their Cournot best
reply function.
Finally, we will conclude that the regulator can avoid RRC or Self-Sabotage
strategies in maximising the welfare when it decides gas released quantities.
Gathering from empirical studies, these quantities should not be so high in
order to let a significant difference between the capacities of both competitor
and incumbent to avoid collusive behaviours.
Keywords: Energy market; Gas release; Regulation; Optimal released quan-
tities; Efficiency; Welfare
JEL Classification : L13, L29, L51, L95
1 Introduction
The european commission has published a lot of directives to open gas and
electricity markets to competition (Green [2007]). With the deregulation of
European energy markets, some regulators have decided to implement asym-
metric regulation. Schankerman (1996) defined a symmetric regulation like a
regulation that gives to all participants to the market the same rules to make
competition. Each of them must receive the same price signal and must respect
the same obligations and restrictions. Starting from this definition, we can de-
fine an asymmetric regulation as a set of regulation rules that apply to one or
some operators. The aim of this regulation is to promote entries of competitors
by an easier access to the commodity.
Asymmetric regulations have been implemented by some regulators in sev-
eral network industries. In telecommunication market, incumbent must serve
the local service and long distance call at a regulated price. Competitors could
propose a smaller price than incumbent one and it could gain customer with this
strategy of cream-skimming. In electricity market, incumbent must release part
of their generation capacity. For example, ENEL (3700 MW in the Sourthern
Italy macro-zone and 150 MWin the Sicily macro-zone) and EDF (1025 MW by
auctions, 736 MW baseload et 289 MW peakload in september 2007) have sold
capacities of production in Virtual Power Plants mechanism. In gas market,
some regulators have implemented gas release programs. The incumbent must
release part of its supplies contracted by long term relations to its competitors
(in France, gas release of 45 TWh by auctions and over the counter negociation).
In this paper, we will focus on asymmetric regulation in European gas mar-
ket. Clastres and David (2005) have shown that incumbent can have incentives
to increase its cost of supply to reduce competitor’s sales. Doing so, the incum-
bent increases its profits. in this paper, we will show the impact of gas release
program on consumers’ surplus and welfare and that this strategy has no impact
on consumer surplus but decreases welfare.
European gas release experiences show that gas release prices are often set
in line with the incumbent’s importation costs, at the weighted average cost of
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gas or by auctions with ceiling price. Price setting mechanism is known by all
participants. Few information is available on gas release proportion setting.
Gas release quantities are set in a less obvious process. We will show that
the regulator can set the gas release proportion to maximise welfare. The only
condition is to know the incumbent supplies.
2 Presentation, strategies and equilibriums of
the Cournot game
We start from Clastres and David’s model (2005). An integrated firm has bought
a capacity of natural gas Ko at unit cost u. This incumbent must offer a propor-
tion α ∈ [0, 1] of its capacity Ko to its competitor on the downstream market at
a price r. The incumbent is an upstream monopolist. However, because of gas
release obligation, it cannot forclore its competitor. The competitor has choice
to buy all or part of released quantities. The regulator determines both α and r
values. Variables Ko, α, u and r are exogenous. Let qo and qe be the quantities
respectively sold by the incumbent and its competitor. This Cournot game deals
with two constraints. The competitor (or gas release) constraint qe ≤ αKo (C1)
stipulates that it cannot sell more than the quantity it got from the incumbent.
And the market constraint qe + qo ≤ Ko (C2) that applies to both operators
which cannot sell more than the incumbent’s supplies. The demand function in
the final market is a linear one, P (q) = 1− q.
Profits are respectively for the incumbent and the competitor:
Πo(qo, qe, r) = P (qo + qe)qo − uKo + rqe (1)
Πe(qo, qe, r) = P (qo + qe)qe − rqe (2)
Authors found that the optimal solutions of the game are those of the si-
multaneous optimization program :


Max
qo
Πo(qo, qe, r) = P (qo + qe)qo −Kou+ rqe
Max
qe
Πe(qo, qe, r) = P (qo + qe)qe − rqe
s/c
{
qe ≤ αKo (λe)
qe + qo ≤ Ko (µo, µe)
.
Let λe be the multiplier value of C1. Each firm has a multiplier value asso-
ciated to C2 (Breton and Zaccour [2001]). They are µe for the competitor and
µo for the incumbent.
To solve this problem, we at first consider constraint C1 and add in a sec-
ond step constraint C2. Four equilibriums are solutions of this maximization
program. They depend on parameters α, Ko and r. We can represent these equi-
libriums in a (Ko, α) graph, for a given r. We have all different cases with the
variation of r. Finally, we obtain four areas (see figure 1) where one equilibrium
can be played by the two firms.
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In the zone 1a, the two constraints are actives, so we have λe =
1
2
−
3
2
αKo−
r > 0 and µκo = 1+αKo− 2Ko > 0. The incumbent’s supplies Ko are too small
to make the two constraints inactive. The equilibrium is :{
qκe = αKo
qκo = (1− α)Ko
. (3)
In the zone 1b, C1 is active (λe > 0). Within this zone, α is too small to
allow the competitor to play its best-reply function; its best strategy is playing
its maximum quantity. The incumbent, because of great values of its supplies,
can play its best-reply function; C2 is inactive. The equilibrium is :{
qκe = αKo
qmo =
1
2
−
1
2
αKo
. (4)
In the zone 2, C2 is binding. This zone is characterized by a multiplicity of
equilibriums (Breton and Zaccour (2001)). This equilibrium is :{
q̂e = 2Ko + µ̂o − 1
q̂o = 1− µ̂o −Ko
. (5)
with µ̂o = −3Ko+2−r− µ̂e and µ̂e > 0. We select one of these equilibriums by
setting µ̂e = 0. For gas industries, this choice is relevant insofar as the incumbent
is in charge of the obligation of supply, the competitor puts no value on relaxing
the market constraint. In this area, α is high enough to make C1 inactive.
Nevertheless, C2 remains active because of the small incumbent’s supplies.
In zone 3, the two constraints are inactive. The two operators can play their
best-reply function. This fourth equilibrium is the classic Cournot one:{
qce =
1
3
−
2
3
r
qco =
1
3
+ 1
3
r
. (6)
All these curves are functions of α, Ko and r. They are drawn in a (Ko, α)
plane for a given gas release price r. If r changes, they all move except µκo that
is constant in r. If the gas release price increase, then the competitor will buy
less gas release quantities. So, the gas release constraint will be inactive for a
large range of Ko or α values. Curves move towards the origin of axes. We will
call (KAo , α
A) the coordinates of A point for a given gas release price r.
Remark 1 All the four zones exist if r ∈
[
0, 1
2
[
. If r ≥ 1
2
, then qce ≤ 0. In
addition, the zones 1a and 1b disappear, and the Cournot equilibrium is not a
feasible one. Then, only the zone of multiplicity of equilibriums can be reach. So,
we will assume that r ∈
]
0, 1
2
[
. If Ko >
2
3
− 1
3
r and r > 1
2
, then the competitor
does not buy any quantity and the incumbent is in a monopoly configuration. In
this case, the regulator does not implement a gas release program. As the gas
release price is based on costs u, we can conclude that u will be less than 1
2
.
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Figure 1: Four equilibriums zones
3 Gas release influence on consumer’s surplus
and welfare
3.1 Gas release and consumer’s surplus
In Clastres and David (2005), we conclude that incumbent could have incentives
to increase its costs to improve its profits on final market. These incentives
depend on initial conditions (Ko, α, u). So, quantities sold on the market could
increase or decrease if the equilibrium moves. These changes in quantities affect
the consumers’ surplus Sc =
1
2
q2 with q = qe + qo and q > 0. Observing this
surplus, we can see that more quantities on the market goes with an increasing
surplus.
The consumers’ surplus is the same when the market constraint C2 is active :
Sκc = Ŝc =
1
2
(Ko)
2, with Sκc the surplus in zone 1a and Ŝc the surplus in zone 2.
In zone 1a or 2, incumbent could have incentives to increase the gas release price
r for a given (Ko, α) pair. This increase in costs does not modify consumers’
surplus. The increase in incumbent profit is only a trade off with competitor’s
profit, not with consumers’ surplus. Competitor’s supply costs increase and its
profit are decreasing because it sells less quantity (the gas release quantity is
active) at the same market price (market constraint is active) but its supply
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cost r increases (zone 2 in figure 1).
Lemma 2 As the market constraint is active, then a gas release price increase,
linked with less efficient incumbent, does not impact consumers’ surplus. The
increase in incumbent’s profit is only a trade off with competitor’s profit.
Acknowledgement 3 The intuition of this lemma is the following. The in-
crease in supply cost does not modify the quantity effect. The two operators still
offer to consumer the same global quantity at the same price because the market
constraint is always active. Operators’ market shares are moving because com-
petitor purchases less gas release quantities, as the gas release price increases.
The incumbent sells the remaining of its supply.
If, for a given (Ko, α) pair, the market constraint is active, all incumbent’s
supplies are sold. With this Ko level, moving from an equilibrium where the
market constraint is active to a Cournot equilibrium (zone 3 in figure 1) deals
with consumers’ surplus losses. Quantities sold on the market was qκe + q
κ
o =
Ko or q̂e + q̂o = Ko, depending on the gas release constraint activity. If the
equilibrium is the unconstraint Cournot one, then quantities are qce + q
c
o < Ko.
So, the consumer surplus decreases. In the other case, the consumer surplus
increases. Incumbent has incentives to be efficient if the equilibrium is the
unconstraint Cournot one to increase its profits (Clastres and David [2005]).
For (Ko, α) pairs with Ko <
2
3
2 and λe < 0, if the equilibrium is in zone
3 (figure 1), then a decrease in incumbent costs or in gas release price could
make the market constraint active. These incentives to efficiency improve the
consumer surplus because consumption on the final market will be Ko instead
of qce + q
c
o.
Lemma 4 At the unconstraint Cournot equilibrium with Ko <
2
3
, the incum-
bent has incentives to be efficient. These incentives improve consumers’ surplus.
Acknowledgement 5 The intuition is the following. If the incumbent does
not sell all its supply, it has incentives to decrease its costs. So, the competitor
purchases more gas release quantities, but its sells and the market price decrease.
The cost effect overcomes the reduction in final price and quantities it could
sell. The incumbent earns more profit with this strategy (profits are decreasing
in costs). As the competitor purchases and sells more gas release quantities, the
market constraint becomes active. The effect on consumers’ surplus is positive.
2For Ko ≥
2
3
, the market constraint is always inactive (Clastres and David [2005]).
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When the incumbent reduces its costs, so the gas release constraint becomes
active for a large range of Ko or α values. The equilibrium could be (q
κ
e , q
m
o ). In
this zone (zone 1b in figure 1), a modification of gas release price could not make
the market constraint active because zones 1b and 1a or 2 are complementary
ones. Then, the consumer will prefer another equilibrium with higher quantities
Ko but this equilibrium could not be reach, except if incumbent gas supplies
decrease. Furthermore, the (qκe , q
m
o ) equilibrium is better than (q
c
e, q
c
o) one for a
given (Ko, α) pair. If the market constraint is inactive, the reaction function of
the incumbent and competitor show that a reduction in incumbent quantities is
compensated by a larger increase in competitor sales. The interest of consumer
is to be in a context where competitor sales are greater. Competitor sales
are maximum when the gas release constraint is active, that means when the
equilibrium is (qκe , q
m
o ) for a given (Ko, α) pair.
As a result, an increase in gas release price reduces the consumer’s surplus
because the gas release constraint becomes inactive. On the other hand, a
decrease in gas release price increases competitor’s sales that overcomes the
diminution effect of incumbent’s sales. A lower gas release price improves the
consumer’s surplus.
Lemma 6 IfKo > K
A
o , then an increase in gas release price reduces consumer’s
surplus if the equilibrium is (qce, q
c
o), and has no effect if the equilibrium stays
(qκe , q
m
o ). A lower gas release price improves or has no effect on consumers’
surplus if we reach the equilibrium (qκe , q
m
o ) or if the equilibrium is (q
c
e, q
c
o).
Proof. See annex 1.
Acknowledgement 7 The intuition is the following. An increase in costs re-
duces the positive effect of quantities lowering the global offer of operators. On
the other hand, if the gas release price is running low, the increase in competi-
tor’s sales compensates the reduction in incumbent’s ones. This effect improves
the consumers’ surplus. If the competitor purchases all gas release quantities
yet, then lowering gas release price only has an effect on operators’ profits.
As we have shown it in Clastres and David [2005], if the incumbent has
incentives to increases its costs, it does not impact consumers. This strategy
has only an impact on competitor’s profits.
Proposition 8 The effect of gas release price changes on consumer’s surplus is
ambiguous and rely on initial conditions of supplies Ko and gas release propor-
tion α. Consumers are better of in markets where both supplies and gas release
proportions are high. If the market is tight, then an increase in gas release price
can reduce consumers’ surplus reducing global quantities sold on the market.
Proposition 9 If the gas release constraint is active or both constraints are
inactive, an increase in gas release price reduces consumer’s surplus if the equi-
librium is (qce, q
c
o) or if the equilibrium moves from (q
κ
e , q
m
o ) to (q
c
e, q
c
o), has no
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effect on this surplus if the equilibrium is (qκe , q
m
o ). Lowering this price in the
same context increase the surplus if the equilibrium is (qce, q
c
o) or if the equi-
librium moves from (qce, q
c
o) to (q
κ
e , q
m
o ), has no effect if the equilibrium stays
(qκe , q
m
o ).
Proof. See annex 1.
Acknowledgement 10 When we study the consumer’s surplus, two effects ap-
pear. The first effect is the incumbent’s cost (Clastres and David [2005]). The
other effect is a quantity one. If incumbent’s supplies are low, the cost effect
has no impact because all supplies are sold. If supplies are in medium or high
values, then an increase in costs reduces quantities sold on the market and has
an impact on welfare. If costs decrease, so the consumers’ surplus increase with
quantities sold. The efficiency’s gain could be profitable for the incumbent; its
profits increase despite of the reduction of both its sales and final price.
If we suppose the regulator wants to maximise the consumer’s surplus, then
it must choose a gas release proportion such as all supplies are sold. If supplies
are very high, the proportion must be chosen to let the competitor playing its
Cournot strategy.
3.2 Gas release and Welfare
Let be W = Πo +Πe + Sc = q(1−
1
2
q)− uKo the welfare of the industry
3 . So,
two effects appear :
• higher are quantities sold on the market, greater will be the welfare4 ;
• if the supply conditions (Ko, u) are well negotiated5 , the welfare will be
high.
These two effects are complementary ones. If supply conditions are well ne-
gotiated, then the competitor must buy more quantities because the gas release
price will be lower. So, the probability of equilibriums where gas release con-
straint or market constraint are actives will increase. When these equilibriums
are played, the global quantity is greater than in Cournot zone, for a given level
of supply Ko. To show the intuition, we start from a given (Ko, α) pair such
as the equilibrium is the unconstrained Cournot one. If the gas release price
decreases, one of the constraints becomes active. We saw that if one constraint
becomes active, quantities sold on the market increase6 . These increases in
3As the demand function is p(q) = 1− q, q ≤ 1. The welfare is a concave function in q and
it is increasing for q ≤ 1.
4For the study of quantities and equilibrium, see the precedent section.
5A small product uKo must say supply condition are efficients, or mean that the market
size is small.
6The competitor wants to buy the minimum between its strategy qκ
e
(the gas release con-
straint is active) or q̂e (the market constraint is active).
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quantities and in efficiency of supply conditions improve the welfare. On the
other hand, for (Ko, α) pairs with 1 − 3αKo < 0 and Ko > K
A
o , the uncon-
strained Cournot equilibrium is unique. If r → 0, the limit of the activity of
the GR constraint is 1− 3αKo = 0. If (Ko, α) are such that 1− 3αKo < 0 and
Ko > K
A
o , so equilibrium is those with constraint inactive, for any GR price r.
GR proportion α or incumbent’s supplies Ko are so high that competitors do
not buy all GR quantities. Thus, we have the same conclusion as those in the
section of consumers’ surplus.
With a high gas release proportion and small supplies, the incumbent could
have incentives to increase its supply cost (Clastres and David [2005]). This
increase could be a less efficient renegotiation of long term supply contract with
gas producers. This strategy does not impact sales on the market because the
market constraint stays active but damages the welfare as it deteriorates supply
conditions and competitors costs (Economides [1998]).
4 The regulator and gas release proportion choice
As we have seen before, gas release price are often set in line with costs, on
non-discriminatory basis. It could be set at an average cost (as in England,
Spain or Italy) or by an auction mechanism (Germany, France or Austria) with
a ceiling price based on supply costs. Auction bids cannot be below this ceiling
price (Clastres [2008]). If costs or ceiling price are lower, then gas release price
could be weak7 and could have an increasing impact on welfare. However, it
is very difficult to know how the gas release proportion α is set. We notice
that its level is between 3 and 10% of the national natural gas consumption
in a country but there is not any further information about it. On the other
hand, we have seen that the gas release proportion could increase incentives
for the incumbent to be less efficient to increase its profits (Clastres and David
[2005]). This strategy has no impact on consumers’ surplus but reduces the
welfare because supply costs increase. The regulator must not set a so high gas
release proportion to avoid this strategy for low supplies (Ko <
1
2
).With a lower
gas release proportion in a weak natural gas supply context, the regulator keep
incentives to efficiency. If supplies are increasing, then incumbent’s incentives
to be les efficient progressively disappear and become inexistent if we are in the
unconstraint Cournot equilibrium, i.e. when Ko >
1
2
et µκo < 0. When supplies
are higher (Ko >
1
2
), the regulator, setting a smaller gas release proportion α
such as λe > 0 et µκo < 0, could lead the competition towards the equilibrium
(qκe , q
m
o ). Thus, the incentives are efficient one. If Ko ∈
[
1
2
, 2
3
]
, the regulator
could set α as µκo > 0.Quantities sold on the market would be greater (all Ko
supplies are sold) but the incumbent could have incentives to be less efficient,
with a negative impact on welfare.
After this short discussion, we assume that regulator wants to maximize the
7 In an auction mecanism, it depends on bids.
9
welfare function W seen above and not only the consumer’s surplus. We have
seen that gas release price is set in line with costs or by an auction mechanism.
So, α will be the variable that the regulator could set to maximise welfare.
If Ko <
1
2
, then all gas release proportion α maximises the welfare because
the market constraint is always active. The supply costs are the only variable
that affects the welfare. So, the regulator has incentives to set a small α to
restore incentives to efficiency. If µκo ≥ 0, the regulator sets α as µ
κ
o = 0.
Doing so, all incumbent’s profits become decreasing and continuous function in
u for u ∈ ]0, 1] . The incumbent has again incentives to renegotiate for the best
its supply costs when renegotiation rounds with producers take place along the
lifetime of the long term take or pay contract. Setting the gas release proportion
α at µκo = 0 level for Ko <
2
3
, the regulator is certain to maximise welfare8 and
restore incentives for the incumbent to be more efficient to increase its profits.
On the other hand, if Ko >
2
3
, then, for any gas release price, the equilibrium
are (qκe , q
m
o ) if λe > 0 et (q
c
e, q
c
o) if λe < 0. The regulator decides to set α to
achieve the equilibrium (qce, q
c
o) for a given (Ko, r) pair. Actually, with an α
leading to the equilibrium (qκe , q
m
o ) for a given (Ko, r) pair, the competitor is
constrained. It would like to buy more gas release quantities at price r and
it would be possible because all Ko supplies are not sold (q
κ
e + q
m
o < Ko).The
reduction in competitor’s sales (it sells qκe instead of q
c
e) is greater than the
increase in incumbent’s sales (qco to q
m
o ). Thus, global quantities sold on the
market decrease for a constant Ko supply level. This effect reduces welfare.
The welfare is greater if regulator chooses a greater gas release proportion α if
supplies are high and if the gas release prise could not modify the equilibrium
(qce, q
c
o).
With a high gas release proportion, the risk of tacit collusion between firms
could increase. So, the regulator must be watchful to incentives to collusion
setting the gas release proportion. Literature on tacit collusion shows that
firms could adopt sustainable collusive behaviours if there exist capacities of
production (Green and Newberry [1992], Crampes and Creti [2005]) and if these
capacities of production are symmetric (Pénard [1997], Bernheim and Whinston
[1990]). So, a high level of gas release price reduces the difference between
capacities of production of competitors and incumbent. This reduction increases
the sustainabilty of collusion. However, if the regulator sets a small gas release
proportion, the difference in capacities always exists and could reduce the risk
of collusion (Compte, Jenny and Rey [2002], Ivaldi and alii [2003]).
Proposition 11 If supplies are low, Ko <
1
2
, the regulator could choose any
proportion in ]0, 1] but it does not be so high to keep incumbent incentives to
efficiency. If supplies are higher, Ko ∈
[
1
2
, 2
3
]
, the regulator maximizes welfare
setting a gas release proportion as µκo = 0. If supplies are greater, Ko >
2
3
, the
regulator set a gas release proportion such as λe < 0.
Proof. See annex 2.
8All supplies Ko are sold.
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Acknowledgement 12 The regulator, setting α, introduces a trade off between
incumbent and competitor profits. The welfare is maximum if quantities sold on
the market are high and if supplies conditions, i.e. cost u and level Ko, are well
negotiated. When supplies in a country are low, all contracted quantities are
sold. So, to maximize welfare, the only solution for the regulator is to improve
incumbent efficiency. More the incumbent is efficient, lower will be the cost of
supplies u and the gas release price r. So, the gas release proportion α must
not be so high to avoid countervailing incentives : the incumbent could have
incentives to increase its costs for high gas release proportions (Clastres and
David [2005]). When supplies are in medium values, the regulator could use
both the gas release proportion and the efficiency of the incumbent to improve
welfare. Its strategy is to assess α as all supplies Ko are sold and incumbent
has incentives to reduce its costs (α as µκo = 0). So, for these values of α, the
competitor purchases all gas release quantities and incumbent sells the remaining
of its supplies (1−α)Ko. As the price on final market is constant and competitor
purchases all gas release quantities, the incumbent could improve its profits and
the welfare if supply costs decrease. If supplies are high, the regulator sets α
to maximise sales on the market and to benefit from incentives to efficiency.
The incumbent, in this case, has incentives to be efficient because competition
has an impact on its profits. Each unit of supply it could not sell decrease its
profits. The regulator could set a gas release proportion greater than in other
cases, notably if all supplies Ko could be sold.
5 Conclusion
We have assumed that supplies Ko were not very adaptable. On the other hand,
we have seen that the incumbent has an influence on gas release price because
they are based on supply costs. This costs could be altered if incumbent, in a
round of renegotiation of supply long term take or pay contracts, is not efficient.
The regulator sets both the gas release proportion and the regulation of gas
release price (equal to costs u or to and auction bid with costs as ceiling price
below which gas release quantities are not sold).
When supplies are low (blue shaded area in figure 2), regulator, setting a
low gas release proportion, increases incumbent incentives to efficiency. This
increase in efficiency does not modify global quantities sold on the market,
so the consumer surplus is constant, but increase the welfare, because supply
conditions are better.
When supplies are higher, so the regulator, setting a gas release proportion
as a function of supplies (red line in figure 2), makes the incumbent efficient.
All supplies Ko are sold, so the consumer surplus is maximum and the welfare
increase because of high value of quantities and incumbent efficiency. If Ko ∈[
1
2
, 2
3
]
, the regulator has a dominant strategy : setting a gas release proportion
as µκo = 0. The red line (figure 2) could be extended to the intersection point,
solution of the system
{
1− 3αKo = 0
Ko =
2
3
.
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When supplies are greater, so several screenplays exist. Regulator maximises
the welfare and surplus setting α as no constraint is active. Actually, setting
a lower value of α, the gas release constraint is active and modifies competitor
strategy. It purchases less quantities and this diminution is more important than
the increase in incumbent sales. So, the surplus and welfare dropped. Regulator,
setting α a higher value of α, maximises surplus and welfare. Effectively, if
supplies are in medium values (green shaded area in figure 2), the incumbent
has incentives to be efficient. This increase in efficiency reduces the gas release
price and the market constraint becomes active. Surplus and welfare increase
because of more quantities with low costs sold on the market. If the efficiency
cannot be modified, then quantities sold are greater than those which smaller
gas release proportion. In the other case, a small gas release proportion makes
the gas release constraint active. Competitor purchases fewer quantities that the
increase in incumbent’s sales does not compensate. Losses in surplus and welfare
appear. If Ko is greater (yellow shaded area in figure 2), then efficiency increase
surplus and welfare. Competitor purchases more quantities (the gas release price
is lower) until the gas release constraint becomes active. This increase is greater
than the incumbent’s sales reduction so, as there are improvements in supply
conditions, welfare and surplus are improved. Finally, when gas penetration in
primary consumption is weighty (yellow squared area in figure 2), so, for any
gas release price r, this case maximises welfare. Competitor purchases greater
gas release quantities because the gas release constraint is inactive. Here again,
welfare and surplus are improved with quantities and efficiency effects.
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7 Annex 1 : Consumer surplus
With our linear demand p(q) = 1 − q, the consumer surplus Sc =
1
2
q2 is an
increasing function of q. Consumers prefers if all supplies are sold, so equilibrium
in zones Ia or II for a given (Ko, α) pair. Quantities in zone Ib are less importants
for a given Ko (q
κ
e +q
κ
o = q̂e+ q̂o = Ko > q
κ
e +q
m
o ). However, if the equilibrium is
in zone Ia or II, it is not possible to reach zone Ib if r modified. These zones are
complementary ones and being in zone Ib depends on initial conditions (Ko, α),
and on r values.
The incumbent could modify the equilibrium with the negociation of its costs
of supply u. It could move from zone Ib to zone III and inversely. However,
incentives goes with efficiency. So, we will study if it is possible that consumer
surplus is higher in zone Ib rather than in zone III. We will compare consumer
surplus in zones Ib and III for all r. Two equilibrium are available :
• The Cusc equilibrium (qce, q
c
o) with S
c
c =
1
18
(r − 2)2 as consumer
surplus;
• the equilibrium with the gas release constraint active (qκe , q
m
o ) with S
κ,m
c =
1
8
(αKo + 1)2 as consumer surplus.
Moving from (qce, q
c
o) towards (q
κ
e , q
m
o ) implies a change in gas release price
r, for a given (Ko, α) pair. If gas release price decrease, competitor could buy
more gas release quantities and to bind the gas release constraint, th incumbent
always playing its best reply function. If gas release price increase, the intuition
is the contrary one. If we call qo(qe) = 1 − 2qe − r the competitor’s Cournot
reaction function and qo(qe) =
1
2
− 1
2
qe those of the incumbent, the explanation
of equilibrium changes is in th following figure.
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The arrow 1 indicates the shift of competitor’s Cournot reaction function if
r decreases, i,e (qce, q
c
o) towards (q
κ
e , q
m
o ). The arrow 2 indicates the same shift
but with an increase in r, i,e (qκe , q
m
o ) towards (q
c
e, q
c
o).
We can distinguish two cases. First, if gas release price variations are too
low to modify the equilibrium, then :
• if the equilibrium is (qce, q
c
o), an increase (decrease) in gas release price
reduces (increases) quantities sold on the market. So, according to reaction
functions, if gas release price decreases, the increase in competitor’s sales
overcomes the decrease in incumbent’ones. Consumers surplus increases.
If gas release price increases, so inversely, consumers surplus is decreasing
because of competitor’s sales are not compensated by incumbent ones.
• We could have the same idea if the equilibrium is (qκe , q
m
o ), except that the
consumer surplus is invariant in r variations, as quantities are independant
in r. The only effect is on operator’s profits.
Second case, if gas release price variations could change the equilibrium zone,
we could move from (qκe , q
m
o ) towards (q
c
e, q
c
o). As we can see in the precedent
figure, an increase in r leads to reduction of qe from qκe towards q
c
e and an
increase in qo from q
m
o to q
c
o. A variation of qe is not compensated by variations
of qo, so quantities sold on the marcket decrease. So, an increase in gas release
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price reduces consumer’s surplus moving from (qκe , q
m
o ) towards (q
c
e, q
c
o). For the
same reason, a decrease in gas release price increase consumer’s surplus, for a
given (Ko, α) pair.
8 Annex 2 : Maximisation of Welfare by regu-
lator
The welfare is W = (1− q)q − uKo +
1
2
q2 = q − 1
2
q2 − uKo.
If Ko <
1
2
, the market constraint is active. So the welfare in independant in
α but depends on supply levels Ko and on supply costs u.
IfKo ∈
[
1
2
, 2
3
]
, all equilibriums are possibles. So we have following quantities
and welfares :
• qκ = q̂ = Ko ⇒Wκ =Wκ,m = Ko −
1
2
K2o − uKo
• qκ,m = 1
2
+ 1
2
αKo ⇒ W
κ,m =
(
1
2
+ 1
2
αKo
)
− 1
2
(
1
2
+ 1
2
αKo
)2
− uKo =
3
8
+ 1
4
αKo −
1
8
α2K2o − uKo
• qc = 2
3
− 1
3
u⇒W c =
(
2
3
− 1
3
u
)
− 1
2
(
2
3
− 1
3
u
)2
−uKo =
4
9
− 1
9
u− 1
18
u2−uKo
The first and third welfare are independant in α. They depends on supply
conditions uKo. But, the second welfare is a function of α. Its maximisation
leads to :
Max
α
Wκ,m ⇒ dW
κ,m
dα
= 1
4
Ko −
1
4
αK2o = 0⇔ α =
1
Ko
.
d2Wκ,m
dα2
= −1
4
K2o < 0 so W
κ,m is a concave fucntion of α and α = 1
Ko
is the maximum of this function. We are in the equilibrium zone II, where
µκo ≤ 0 ⇔ 1 − 2Ko + αKo ≤ α ⇔ α < αo =
2Ko−1
Ko
. If α = 1
Ko
could be reach,
it must be such as α < αo ⇔
2Ko−1
Ko
−
1
Ko
> 0 ⇔ 2Ko−1
Ko
> 0, wrong because
Ko <
2
3
(the limit of the existence of zone 2 is such as µ̂o > 0 ⇔ Ko <
2−r
3
with the upper limit when r = 0, i,e Ko <
2
3
) so this maximum could not be
reached. We are in the increasing part of the welfare. The regulator sets αo to
maximise the welfare. We are on the curve µκo = 0, with continu and decreasing
profit and no incentives to increase costs of supply u.
If Ko >
2
3
, so two equilibriums are only available, for all r values. these two
equilibriums are (qκe , q
m
o ), only the gas release constraint is active, or (q
c
e, q
c
o),
the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium. Supplies Ko are high enought to make
the market constraint inactive. The regulator maximise the welfare setting a gas
release proportion such as λe < 0. For all r, setting a gas release proportion such
as λe > 0, the regulator could constraint competitor. The competitor wishes
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to buy qce but, as a lower value of α, it could only buy q
κ
e . So, quantities sold
on the market are lower. If gas release proportion is higher, the equilibrium is
(qce, q
c
o). Competitor does not buy all gas release quantities, the incumbent plays
its Cournot best reply function but the quantities sold on the market are higher.
The following figure illustrates this case.
qe(qo) 
qo(qe) 
qo+qe≤Ko 
α1 Ko 
qe 
qo 
qo
m 
 qe
κ 
qo
c 
 qe
c 
α2 Ko 
 
If Ko ≥
2
3
and if gas release price is constant, if the regulator chooses α = α1
with α1 such as λe > 0, so the equilibrium is (qκe , q
m
o ). If, the regulator sets
α = α2 with α2 such as λe < 0, so the equilibrium is (q
c
e, q
c
o). For the same (Ko, r)
pair, the gas release constraint is inactive and competitor’s quantities, thus total
quantities sold on the market, increase. As the incumbent has incentives to be
efficient, the cost of supply, and r, could decrease. So, if gas release proportion is
such as λe < 0 with 1−3αKo > 0, a reduction in r could modify the equilibrium
from (qce, q
c
o) to (q
κ
e , q
m
o ). Thus, the competitor could move from an equilibrium
wherre the gas release constraint is inactive to an equilibrium where it becomes
actives, increasing quantities and welfare.
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